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“What if the EU …?”:
An Exercise in Counterfactual Thinking to Address Current Dilemmas
Edited by Roderick Parkes and Almut Möller
With contributions by Cornelius Adebahr, Josef Janning, Dariusz Kalan, Stefan Meister, 
Tim Oliver, Nicolai von Ondarza, Hugh Pope, Jan Techau, and Paweł Tokarski .
Introduction
These nine essays cover a good cross section 
of  the European Union’s activity. They look at 
its internal functioning (national parliaments, 
political union and coalition-building between 
member states). They look at key policy fields, 
notably monetary union. They look at member-
ship, from widening the EU (enlargement policy 
toward the Western Balkans and Ukraine) to 
shrinking it (the exit of  the UK). And they look 
at the EU’s broader transformative powers vis-
à-vis Cyprus and the countries of  the southern 
Mediterranean.
At the same time, none of  the scenarios they 
examine are real – for this is a collection of  
counterfactual essays. Our authors are prin-
cipally interested in imagining an alternative 
reality.
What does this kind of  imaginative “what if  …?” 
approach achieve that a traditional descriptive-
analytical approach cannot? Is it more than just 
another excuse for the EU to gaze at its own 
navel? Well yes – and no. Depending on how the 
exercise is handled, counterfactual thinking can 
either be a means of  generating new ideas via – 
yes – navel-gazing, or it can function as a means 
of  shutting down wishful thinking and introduc-
ing much greater realism to a discussion. The 
authors collected here have done both.
On the imaginative side:
• Jan Techau points out that the EU should feel 
free to make big, imaginative over-commitments 
in its neighborhood; these are part of  the EU 
methodology, challenging the Union to trans-
form itself. Reimagining the EU’s response to 
the Arab Spring, he says we should not under-
estimate the internal effect of  external policies 
– nor overemphasize their immediate external 
effect.
• Josef  Janning argues that when it comes to 
treaty change we need less “realism” in EU 
affairs and more policymakers asking “what 
if  …” It’s not big ideas that annoy voters, he 
argues, but rather politicians who lack confi-
dence in their own systems. Reimagining the 
debate twenty years ago, he also points out 
that we rarely have the chance to correct past 
choices – especially those not taken.
• Cornelius Adebahr imagines what would have 
happened if  Yugoslavia, instead of  disintegrat-
ing, had instead joined the EU as part of  its 
eastern and southeastern enlargement. This 
forces him to reimagine the enlargement pro-
cess, the development of  security and defense 
policy, and the phenomenon of  eroding 
national sovereignty – as well as uprooting the 
sense of  triumphalism and inevitability that 
accompanied the enlargement.
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• Dariusz Kalan argues that if  the Visegrad 
Group did not exist today it would need to be 
invented. But ten years after it achieved its core 
mission of  ushering Poland, Slovakia, Hun-
gary and the Czech Republic into the EU and 
NATO, the future of  the format is by no means 
guaranteed. Kalan describes what the V4’s new 
mandate should look like.
Meanwhile, on the corrective side:
• Tim Oliver clarifies the UK’s choices regard-
ing EU affairs at a time when it is discussing 
leaving the Union, exploring how events would 
have unfolded had the British voted to leave the 
European Economic Community back in 1975. 
He shows that the UK is currently indulging in 
a politics of  false choices while squandering its 
real options.
• Nicolai von Ondarza worries that national par-
liaments are being treated as a panacea to the 
EU’s democratic problems. He re-walks the 
course of  the eurozone crisis, imagining how 
national parliaments would have behaved had 
they had the power to steer the EU’s actions. 
The result is cause for skepticism about their 
potential.
• Paweł Tokarski confronts those arguing that 
the EU would have been better off  without the 
Euro by pointing out that it was an almost inev-
itable reaction to the structure of  the European 
economy. He explores what an alternative sys-
tem of  exchange-rate stabilization might have 
looked like, concluding that there would have 
been no winners in the Union in this scenario.
• Stefan Meister, in an essay written on the eve of  
this year’s major changes in Ukraine, cautions 
against fantasizing about the reach and power 
of  the EU. Even if  the Union had offered 
Ukraine a membership perspective after the 
Orange Revolution in 2004, there is no guaran-
tee that the country would have changed from 
within.
• Hugh Pope makes the point that “what ifs …” 
are an integral part of  Turkish and Cypriot 
blame shifting and that their excuses need to be 
examined critically in order to force people to 
take responsibility for their own mistakes. He 
looks back to a time when the Cyprus issue 
really could have been solved, encouraging a 
new sense of  responsibility.
Each of  these essays reflects on current dilemmas 
by looking at past decisions. By extension, one 
might just as well reflect on the choices the EU 
and its members have yet to take. What if  the EU 
were to create an unemployment insurance scheme 
as a pillar of  monetary union? (This proposal was 
suggested by one outgoing EU Commissioner.) 
What if  negotiations over the transatlantic trade 
and investment partnership (TTIP) succeed? What 
if  they fail? How about handing agricultural policy 
over to the EU’s member states? Heck, what if  the 
EU found itself  by 2030 to be the sole pole in a 
unipolar order? What would it take to get there?
With the May 2014 European Parliament elections 
behind them and a new president of  the European 
Commission about to come in – not to mention 
a reform list branded a “strategic agenda for the 
Union in times of  change” – EU leaders are trying 
hard to demonstrate that they understand the wake-
up call. The European Union needs to change, and 
old certainties of  direction, ways, means, and the 
substance of  European integration have been ques-
tioned. Making the case for fundamental reform 
has become part of  the mainstream EU debate. 
But if  there is now a happy consensus over the 
need for change, then the question remains how 
and to what end?
A more imaginative way of  discussing options for 
the future of  the European Union will not make 
the EU look weaker but stronger. After all, it is 
politics that will ultimately determine which ideas 
persist, and which ones fail to inspire majorities of  
voters.
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Concept: The Thinking behind the 
“What If …?” Project
European think tanks spend too little time ponder-
ing the way things could be, but rather analyze why 
things happen the way they do. In order to make 
room in the political science realm for more of  
the former, we present a series of  creative thought 
exercises on current political dilemmas.
For the past five years, politics in Europe has been 
defined by a lack of  options. The last German 
government has claimed “there is no alternative” 
to its policies on the eurozone. The British finance 
minister urged eurozone countries to cede to “the 
relentless logic of  fiscal union.” Populist parties 
across Europe argued that voters were being per-
mitted to change governments but not policies 
(which are dictated by the EU and the markets). We 
have thus been practicing a kind of  non-politics at 
a moment in Europe’s history when the range of  
choices before us is in fact enormous.
So where are the think tanks – Denkfabriken (“idea 
factories” in German) – to point this out and pres-
ent the options? We’ve been nowhere really. The 
reason is that most of  us continental think-tankers 
consider ourselves researchers schooled in political 
science – we are more interested in describing and 
explaining realities than imagining alternatives. And 
the reason for that preference is also clear: not only 
is describing reality the easy option, the mantle of  
scientific neutrality also protects us from charges 
of  political bias. By contrast, creative thinking 
would take us perilously close to advertising, lobby-
ing and political bias –things the EU’s policymakers 
are rather sensitive about.
The irony, of  course, is not just that the usual 
descriptive-analytical thinking leads us to repro-
duce political realities and hierarchies. It is that 
every other branch of  science besides political 
science is so creative. In the natural sciences, for 
instance, “invention” does not just mean a process 
of  research and investigation, but conjuring up 
things that did not previously exist. No wonder 
the most famous natural scientists have made their 
reputations by overturning accepted wisdom and 
consensus. In the political arena, however, that kind 
of  thinking is met at best with indifference – gov-
ernance these days is about practical realities – at 
worst with outright suspicion.
With this collection of  essays originally published1 
with the Polish Institute of  International Affairs 
(PISM) and the IP Journal of  the German Council 
on Foreign Relations (DGAP), the editors hope to 
take a small step in a different direction. Instead of  
asking “What is the EU…?” these counterfactual 
essays imagine “What if  the EU…?” The point is 
to re-examine the dilemmas facing politicians and 
to highlight overlooked or discounted choices. We 
do this primarily by revisiting past decisions and 
imagining how alternative solutions would have 
played out. Ironically, this counterfactual thinking 
is already being used by governments in their own 
strategic foresight exercises.
The starting point for each of  the nine essays is 
always a current object of  European gridlock or a 
situation where the current range of  choices is par-
ticularly narrow. Authors were free to choose which. 
And the aims are quite simply: to help decision-
makers reconcile themselves to bold options or, 
where necessary, to the lack of  choices available; to 
overcome the well-known psychological tendency 
to draw lessons only from the choices made rather 
than those rejected; and to reduce the uncertain-
ties surrounding future choices by highlighting past 
parallels.
But the big question has been: Is that scientific? 
Political scientists make three common lines of  
critique against counterfactual histories. First, that 
these undermine the serious scientific laws of  
cause and effect (counterfactualists speculate on 
how things might have turned out different and 
cannot test their assumptions). Second, and just 
the opposite, these give undue weight to the scien-
tific notion of  cause and effect (counterfactualists 
strengthen the idea that there are crucial turning 
points in history). Third, there’s just no point in 
counterfactuals (analysts should rather spend their 
time working out what did actually happen).
Happily, academics like Bradley MacKay provide 
an answer.2 First, they reply, no serious cause-effect 
argument can exist without an implicit counterfac-
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tual exercise. Every time political scientists make a 
claim about why something has occurred, they are 
effectively arguing that the alternative explanations 
are weak and implausible. Counterfactual histories, 
by making their claims and assumptions explicit, 
actually improve the testability of  cause-effect 
relationships.
This in turn shows how counterfactual exercises 
can be used to undermine weak cause-effect argu-
ments and thus the idea of  key turning points. For 
instance, the famous essay “What if  Henry Ford 
had started his car factory in Birmingham, UK?” is 
structured so as to undermine the sense of  Ameri-
can triumphalism that clouded accounts of  the 
US’s industrial power. It showed that Ford could 
have succeeded outside the supposedly special con-
ditions of  the US.
Finally, imagining alternate outcomes for past 
decisions actually increases history’s usefulness: it 
allows analysts not just to seek out historical par-
allels but to actively create them. Counterfactual 
analysis relies on typical historical methods (identi-
fying the causal factors for a certain outcome). The 
difference is that it playfully rearranges them to 
imagine alternative scenarios more relevant to the 
present. This is a victory of  scientific method over 
serendipity.
But that’s an academic defense. How about a think 
tank defense? Can think tanks use this kind of  
creative thinking without straying over the line into 
political dependence? The answer is that, for think 
tanks, there is no such thing as political indepen-
dence. Or there shouldn’t be if  they wish to be 
effective. Political dependence arises not from a 
think tank’s funding sources or need to please their 
backers, but from the imperative of  making the 
public listen to them. This kind of  political depen-
dence, understood as relevance, is something to 
embrace. Think tank output needs to be interesting, 
and counterfactual thinking seems as good a means 
as any to achieve that.
Obviously, there are sections of  the political arena 
that will be more receptive to such playfulness than 
others. Yet, whatever the skepticism, this kind of  
exercise can be fruitful. We see this as an active 
contribution to broaden the options for all those 
interested in critical engagement with the European 
Union and would like to thank our colleagues for 
joining in this exercise, and the Alfred Freiherr von 
Oppenheim-Stiftung for generously supporting this 
publication.
Roderick Parkes and Almut Möller 
Warsaw and Berlin, September 2014
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Now entering its twentieth year of  existence, the 
Visegrad Four (V4) format faces questions regard-
ing its raison d’être that go beyond mere public 
relations problems. Central Europe experts fielding 
queries from journalists have had to learn to give a 
simple answer to the recurrent question: “What is 
the Visegrad Four for?” Or the cheekier alternative: 
“Can you list the V4’s recent achievements?” The 
public remains largely unaware of  the common 
objectives and initiatives of  “the Four.” Perhaps 
the main problem is that the V4’s founding objec-
tive has in fact already been achieved. The V4 was 
initiated in 1991 to facilitate the Euro-Atlantic 
integration of  three former Eastern Bloc countries: 
Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (which later 
split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia). Today, 
all four countries are members of  both the EU and 
NATO.
In the meantime, cooperation on EU-related issues 
has become the most important subject of  debate 
within the V4. Discussions run the gamut from 
infrastructure to energy security. Although much 
less experienced than its western or northern coun-
terparts (for example, the Benelux Union, estab-
lished in 1944 and the Nordic Council launched 
in1952), the V4 managed to build “brand recogni-
tion” over the past two decades among EU poli-
cymakers. This is a holdover from the 1990s, how-
ever; the V4 still lacks a solid institutional structure. 
To date, no V4 achievement will be listed among 
the great triumphs of  EU history. To make that 
list, it needs to deliver more concrete, more visible 
results.
So: what if  the Visegrad Group had been dis-
banded in 2004, when all four states had officially 
joined the European Union and their membership 
in NATO was complete? Would relations among 
the countries of  Central Europe be better or worse 
today?
Mission Accomplished or More Work to be 
Done?
The V4 was useful in the early 1990s when its tar-
get was to help Central European countries join 
Euro-Atlantic institutions. There were certainly 
clashes among “the Four” in the 1990s – the most 
eye-popping of  which occurred when the Czech 
politician Václav Klaus practically refused to coop-
erate. And yet the resolution of  these problems, 
and the proof  of  collective solidarity, was much 
appreciated by both NATO and the EU, which 
opened their doors in 1999 and 2004, respectively. 
Henceforth, the EU took over as guarantor of  
Central Europe’s economic and societal devel-
opment, while NATO extended its protective 
umbrella over the region. The V4 had lost its rai-
son d’être and, with the establishment of  the Inter-
national Visegrad Fund in 2000, the format looked 
set to enter retirement, limiting its role to providing 
grants and scholarships.
Indeed, if  the V4 really had in fact succeeded in 
resuscitating its political agenda after 2004, it might 
well have jeopardized the original mission: Western 
integration. In some readings, the format is the 
child of  an internecine dispute among dissidents 
and intellectuals over the fate of  Central Europe. 
Back in the 1970s and 1980s, the Eastern Blockers 
keenly wished to locate their identity in opposition 
to the Soviet Bloc. Figures like Czesław Miłosz, 
György Konrád and Václev Havel thus initiated a 
dialogue about the region’s own history, heritage 
and experience. Thirty years on, however, in an era 
when politics is understood as pure pragmatism, a 
mere tool for engineering economic growth and 
high levels of  consumption, this “idealist side” of  
the V4 looks like a relic of  old times – especially 
if  the V4 were to forge a new political identity in 
opposition to NATO, the EU or Western Europe.
Completing the Mission: What If the Visegrad Group no Longer 
Existed?
Dariusz Kalan
Dariusz Kalan asks whether relations among the countries of Central Europe would be better or worse 
today without the Visegrad format .
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And yet there could be a very strong rationale 
indeed for the Visegrad group’s continued exis-
tence. The problem is only that the V4 has failed to 
locate it. To those analysts of  Central Europe who 
take a long view, this is all too clear. They acknowl-
edge a qualitative difference between what Central 
Europe has experienced in this century’s first two 
decades and the turbulent interwar period of  the 
last. Back then, neighborly relations were any-
thing but trouble free. Hungarians sought revenge 
on Slovaks and Romanians for territorial losses 
brought about by the Treaty of  Trianon (1920); the 
Poles were at loggerheads with the Czechs, Lithu-
anians, and Ukrainians. That interwar world is of  
course long gone, but it is worth noting that the 
post-1989 period is the first time in the region’s his-
tory that relations in Central Europe have not been 
based on hegemony, domination or fear. By this 
logic, it would be foolish to assume that this posi-
tive juncture will persist without effort and great 
care.
Petty nationalism, historical resentments, and 
minority problems – all of  these could resurface 
sooner or later, especially in times of  economic 
turmoil, when the EU is exerting a strong norma-
tive influence on each of  the Four, and when large 
EU member states are talking about repatriating 
EU competencies. This is precisely why the region 
needs an internal platform for dialogue and coop-
eration such as the Visegrad Group. This platform 
allows its members to discuss their common inter-
ests, voice them jointly within the EU, and thereby 
balance national egoisms. Bearing in mind the tor-
tured experiences of  the past, it seems sensible to 
strive for the closest possible collaboration among 
Central European countries. This cooperation 
should not only include the search for a common 
political voice in the EU but also contribute to 
strengthening ties in many non-political areas.
The platform is thus not just about squeezing 
money from the EU for large-scale projects. The 
real stimulus for cooperation, it is argued, can 
be joint projects leading to decent and shared 
infrastructure that will, in turn, create strong ties 
between cities and among peoples. Today, these 
ties are surprisingly weak. It is extraordinarily chal-
lenging to get from one Central European city to 
another, and we know astonishingly little about the 
history, past, and present of  our respective neigh-
bors. These gaps are potentially treacherous, ripe 
for easy exploitation by populists, who are always 
happy to use ignorance for their purposes. It is 
argued that leaving the V4 format to politicians 
would severely undermine its potential for develop-
ing social contacts and mutual understanding.
Looking for a new foundation
Nobody doubts the importance of  deepening 
ties among the countries of  Eastern and Central 
Europe. The question, rather, is whether the Viseg-
rad format is the right umbrella for this work. We 
tend to forget that after the collapse of  Commu-
nism a range of  Central European formats were 
in fact established. All of  them have lost their 
significance or experienced outright extinction over 
the last twenty years. (Among these, the Central 
European Initiative is the most telling example.) It 
is no feather in the V4’s cap that nothing competes 
with Visegrad in the region today. Nevertheless, 
this does suggest that the V4 has the potential to 
become something much more important than a 
provider of  grants or an initiative completely sub-
ordinated to the EU. There are at least four areas 
where the V4 could play a more proactive role:
A common V4 voice is still missing in relations 
with eastern and southern neighbors. Poland, Hun-
gary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic all have a 
strong interest in developments in Ukraine; they 
either share a common border with it or support 
Ukrainian civil society. But the recent crisis in Kiev 
shows that even the V4 members tend to act sepa-
rately and only with moderate success. The same is 
true as far as the Western Balkans are concerned; 
indeed, some of  the Four are less involved in this 
region for historical or political reasons, which does 
not help bolster the Visegrad image as an effective 
promoter of  its own transformation experience.
Energy security – and more specifically gas security 
– points to a potential success story. In many ways, 
the “formative experiences” for the region were the 
2006 and 2009 cuts in [Russian] gas supply. These 
led to many substantial improvements within the 
so-called North-South Initiative, and today the 
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readiness of  the Four to deal with similar problems 
is higher than it was between 2005 and 2010. Still, 
this is only the starting point for more ambitious 
joint goals. The Four must resist once again fall-
ing prey to national egoisms, which would mean 
wasting the chance for both diversification and for 
creating a common market in the region.
Another challenge is how to manage the relation-
ship with global powers: the US, China, and Rus-
sia. For economic and political reasons, these 
countries are still investing in their presence in 
Central Europe. To these large powers, a creature 
like Visegrad simply does not exist. They do not 
hear a common Visegrad voice. This is why it is so 
easy for global powers to play the game of  “divide 
and rule” in the region, even while they court such 
“brand entities” as Scandinavia. For the V4, a stark 
choice will present itself: either take a greater and 
more united interest in global issues (also with the 
wider EU) or face isolation. This certainly may be a 
chance for the region to establish its own political 
identity.
Last but not least: this is also the right time to initi-
ate a healthy dispute about the Visegrad group. No 
dialogue on “Central European policy” has yet 
been successfully implemented in any of  the four 
countries. In Poland, for instance, the intellectual 
heritage of  “Central European policy” is hardly 
of  less importance than of  the Eastern policy (the 
Giedroyc doctrine), yet it is the latter that still stirs 
public emotions, provokes arguments and remains 
consistently at the heart of  media attention. Per-
haps it is an effect of  the process of  joining the 
EU. In their own affairs, the Four have been 
“Europeanized” – trained by Brussels. When it 
comes to the east, however, they still feel they have 
something to teach Brussels.
In all of  these areas, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia must decide if  they want to 
be real players – or just be four more tennis balls.
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What if ? – Policy analysts ask it every day. They 
are scenario builders, operating under the assump-
tion that their decisions will bring about a desired 
outcome. Sometimes they even break the taboo 
and look backward as well, turning their “what ifs?” 
into “if  onlys.” Should we have done that thing we 
were pondering but then dismissed? Could we have 
avoided the mess we are in now if  we had done 
things differently?
Today, the EU’s response to the Arab Spring of  
2010–12 is deemed to have been one of  the great 
missed opportunities in the Union’s history. Ana-
lysts wonder whether these fledgling democratic 
movements could have avoided meltdown if  only 
the EU had followed through on its rhetoric. But 
it misses the point to simply ask what would have 
happened if  the EU had implemented its program 
of  offering the “three Ms” to Arab countries (mar-
ket access, mobility, and money) more vigorously. 
It is better to draw practical lessons than merely 
lament lost opportunities.
EU integration is typically driven by a technocratic 
“ratchet” mechanism. By this model, a success-
ful initiative in one field has a positive impact (or 
“spillover”) on action in another. In terms of  EU 
external affairs, however, the ratchet mechanism 
is far more political. This is an aspirational policy 
where, through high-level international commit-
ments and conditionality mechanisms, the EU 
forces itself  to take a certain course. It is part of  
EU external policy for the Union to overshoot in 
terms of  its rhetoric and then scramble to provide 
effective policy, since this would require internal 
reforms within the Union that are often difficult to 
reach, in particular under time pressure.
In this context, we must consider not only whether 
the support promised by the EU would have 
helped bring about a transformation in Arab coun-
tries but also whether the internal reforms the EU 
would have had to envisage for itself  would have 
been helpful for the “transforming” neighbors – or 
even realistic.
The EU’s Three Ms
In March 2011, in rather quick reaction to the revo-
lutions in the Arab world, the EU Commission and 
the European External Action Service (EEAS) pre-
sented a substantially updated version of  the Euro-
pean Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The central 
pillars of  the new policy, far exceeding the classic 
EU approach to foreign aid, were designed to pro-
vide these societies in turmoil not just with material 
backing but also with politically tailored support.
In retrospect it is clear that the EU did not meet 
the expectations it created. The EU is today criti-
cized for “having lost its southern neighborhood,” 
for being a marginal player in the region, and for 
yet again missing a strategic opportunity to act as 
a forceful agent of  change. So, what if  the Union 
had opened its markets for competitive products 
from the southern Mediterranean, lifted its severe 
restrictions on refugees and immigrants from 
the region, and disbursed substantial amounts of  
money to influence the developments in those 
places?
Markets first
One of  the key problems created by the uprisings 
in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia was that 
they led to a precipitous economic downswing. 
Production dipped, tourism collapsed, and capital 
was withdrawn on a large scale. The EU had only 
one really effective means of  response: abolishing 
trade barriers in sectors where the “transforming” 
countries had a comparative advantage over the EU. 
Gaining access to the huge European market for 
Transforming the EU from within: What If Europeans Had Made Truly 
Ambitious Commitments after the Arab Spring?
Jan Techau
Jan Techau argues that even if the EU had met its strategy for post-revolution Arab countries, it would still 
have fallen short . But it would at least have had a transformative effect on the Union itself .
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agricultural products, textiles, and low-tech indus-
trial products could have prodded entrepreneurs 
and investors into providing the cash-strapped 
economies with investments and liquidity. More-
over, the EU would finally have shaken off  its 
reputation for protectionism and even “economic 
colonialism.”
That, at least, was the theory. Yet, it is unclear 
whether these positive effects would have been 
achievable. Would providing stimulus to these 
emerging markets have made an immediate dif-
ference? Would weakened Arab economies have 
been able to adapt swiftly enough to grasp the new 
opportunities? Would governments in the region 
have reciprocated the EU’s move toward economic 
openness, deregulating their own systems and 
unleashing market forces? Or would market expo-
sure perhaps have had a detrimental effect?
While the effect of  the first M – Money – on the 
Arab Spring is far from clear, the internal effects of  
such an expenditure on the EU would have been 
enormous. The EU would have been obliged to 
compensate European farmers and manufacturers 
with very large sums indeed. The impact on the 
budget negotiations for the Multiannual Financial 
Framework (the EU’s budget for the period 2014–
20) would have been profound. Similarly profound 
would have been the impact on the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), which would not have 
survived in its current form. Real CAP reform – an 
issue that has been on the EU agenda for the bet-
ter part of  an entire generation – would have been 
unavoidable. Fisheries, consumer protection, and 
health policies would also have been affected.
Mobility next
Again, it is hard to access the impact that such a 
policy would have had on the countries in question. 
Could a country like Egypt have “exported” a sig-
nificant number of  its unemployed young people 
and thereby relieve some of  the pressures on its 
own labor market? Would it not have resulted in 
a brain drain, depriving Egypt of  the educated 
experts it so desperately needs to build a modern 
state and economy? Would these immigrants have 
subsequently returned to their home countries, 
bringing with them a reverse knowledge transfer? 
Or would migratory flows from sub-Saharan Africa 
have increased, creating veritable “refugee tour-
ism” to Europe? If  none of  these scenarios sounds 
implausible, none of  them were certain either.
Once again, the impact of  the second M – mobil-
ity – on Europe itself  is much easier to gauge. We 
would have immediately seen a bust-up over the 
actual numbers of  people allowed in, to say noth-
ing of  squabbling over national quotas. (How many 
from each country? How many to which European 
country?). At present, the EU’s only real area of  
competency relates to issuing short-term visas. Dis-
cussions over free movement, work permits, access 
to welfare, and the recognition of  diplomas would 
have been extensive and heated, intensified by the 
pressure to get quick results. Populist right-wing 
movements across Europe would have used the 
increased debate for their own purposes, trying to 
cash in on a heightened sense of  fear in an already 
charged atmosphere.
Under these tense circumstances, European lead-
ers would have been forced not only to create 
improvised immigration programs but also to 
push through quick fixes in immigration policies. 
Under the best of  circumstances, this could have 
produced the kernel of  a truly Europe-wide immi-
gration policy. In the worst case, existing problems 
in this field could have been strongly aggravated, 
especially in countries with sizable North Afri-
can communities, such as France, Spain, and the 
Netherlands; for these would be the places toward 
which the majority of  new immigrants would likely 
gravitate.
Finally, money
The impact that large-scale EU spending would 
have had in the recipient countries is unclear. It 
seems highly likely that the political elites, regard-
less of  their affiliation, would have spent the cash 
primarily on consolidating their power base (that 
is, by keeping the small, informal power coalitions 
that keep them in office contented). As for the 
EU, if  it had actually intended to follow through 
on its spending agenda, the following questions 
would have been absolutely unavoidable: What 
DGAPanalyse 19 | October 2014
13
do we actually want to buy? How much money is 
required? Who is in charge of  spending it? Under 
intense political pressure to get value for money, a 
profound strategic debate would have ensued in 
Europe on the short- and long-term goals of  stra-
tegic investment– for the first time ever and under 
very trying circumstances.
A large spending program would also have required 
deep coordination between the EU’s institutions 
and its member states. None of  the mechanisms 
in the EU Commission or, say, the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) would have been suffi-
cient in dealing with strategic amounts of  money 
and highly political ends. Channeling the funds to 
recipient countries would ultimately have required 
an entirely new mechanism. At a political and tech-
nical level, the Commission and the EEAS would 
have been forced to work together very closely – a 
welcome side effect of  the emergency but one 
that would not have been free of  friction. Likewise, 
member states would have been forced to enable 
the institutions to execute a grand-scale investment 
of  this kind. This could have worked wonders in 
terms of  persuading EU countries to “buy in” to a 
more unified European foreign policy.
Would the geopolitical nature of  such an exercise 
have made it necessary to forgo the high prin-
ciples of  conditionality and values-based foreign 
policy? This is a major question. Conditionality has 
sometimes been blamed for turning grand strategic 
action into mere bookkeeping. Much would have 
depended on whether the goal of  the spending 
spree was simply to create stability or, more ambi-
tiously, to create something lasting, long-term, and 
sustainable. In any case, the ready flow of  EU cash 
would have carried with it a strong risk of  merely 
encouraging corruption on a grand scale in the 
recipient countries – as is so often the case when 
spending takes place in a rushed, heavy-handed way.
Unclear Political Impact
On balance, it is highly unlikely that a more robust 
implementation of  the EU’s three Ms policy in 
the region would have done much to change the 
domestic dynamics in the Arab world that prevailed 
in the past three years. Political and social fault 
lines are too deeply embedded in these societies, 
and outside players like the EU could not have 
affected – and indeed, cannot affect – them easily. 
With or without EU money, the Muslim Brother-
hood would have still dominated the political scene 
in Egypt, and the suppression of  that organization 
by the military would have been merely slowed but 
not prevented. Furthermore, protesters of  all polit-
ical stripes had made it clear from the outset that 
this revolution was “theirs,” and that outside play-
ers, especially from the West, should for once stay 
out. It is moreover possible that many of  the new 
players in the region would have rejected Western 
help and Western money for fear of  being called 
collaborators and traitors.
In geopolitical terms, very heavy EU investment 
would have made close coordination with the 
United States indispensable. This stands in stark 
– and ostensibly positive – contrast to the reality: 
unsynchronized European and American reactions 
to the Arab Spring. At the same time, a visibly 
coordinated effort between the EU and the US 
could have intensified the feeling in the Arab World 
that, once again, the region was destined to become 
a playing field for external players. Europe’s intensi-
fied engagement, moreover, could also have trig-
gered a response by other heavily invested players 
in the region, namely Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the 
Arab states of  the Persian Gulf. Perhaps it would 
have even led to intensified engagement by China 
and Russia, the former being heavily dependent on 
the region’s oil, the latter with a strong interest in 
keeping oil prices high and maintaining its (albeit 
limited) strategic influence in the region.
Ironically, the three Ms would probably have had 
the strongest impact in Europe itself. Their imple-
mentation would have massively influenced the 
way EU foreign policy is planned and conducted, 
would have shaped EU development and neighbor-
hood policies, and would have had an important 
impact both on the relationship between the mem-
ber states and EU institutions and on many policy 
developments at the national level. They could have 
led to a disproportionate EU focus on the South-
ern neighborhood at the expense of  the Eastern 
neighborhood, leading to internal friction in the 
EU. They might have also even given the ques-
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tion of  the EU Common Security and Defense 
Policy (CSDP) a very different dynamic. There is 
something part tragic, part comical in the idea that 
a massive foreign policy engagement would change 
the subject of  that policy more profoundly than its 
object. In a backhanded way, this is proof  that the 
transformative power of  EU foreign policy must 
never be underestimated.
DGAPanalyse 19 | October 2014
15
On June 5, 1975 a Labour government put a choice 
to the British people: they could either leave the 
European Economic Community (EEC) or vote 
to stay, according to the terms that Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson and his government had negotiated. 
The result seemed a solid commitment: a 67 per-
cent vote in favor, with voter turnout of  65 percent. 
European integration has nevertheless remained 
one of  the most divisive issues in British politics, 
splitting parties and helping topple prime ministers. 
Relations between the UK and the rest of  Europe 
have been difficult too, typified by opt-outs and 
vetoes.
It is therefore easy to surmise that both British 
politics and European integration would have 
been better off  had the British voted to leave in 
1975. However, the present “What if…” analysis 
suggests that both the UK and the EEC would 
have remained tightly bound to each other, drawn 
together by the UK’s need for some form of  close 
economic and political relationship and the EEC’s 
desire to manage its role as Europe’s central eco-
nomic and political organization. The fact that both 
would have found this setup difficult offers point-
ers to what may lie ahead should Britain ever vote 
to leave.
The Alternative EEC: Decentralized and 
Liberal
Imagine, if  you will, a completely different scenario: 
The morning of  June 6, 1975 was a somber one for 
the European Commission. It had been counting 
on a successful enlargement, wherein the inclusion 
of  the UK would provide a useful counterbalance 
to French power and thus a means of  asserting its 
own political predominance. Instead, Britain voted 
for exit, triggering member governments to invest 
more thoroughly in bilateral relations and conse-
quently keeping the EEC’s central institutions quite 
weak. As it scrambled to find means of  pushing 
integration forward, the Commission’s proposed 
Single European Act thus reflected a careful com-
promise between north and south.
The Single European Act would have reduced the 
common market’s remaining economic barriers but 
also put in place strong common social rights. In 
negotiations between governments, however, it was 
the Anglo-Saxon neoliberal economic agenda then 
sweeping the US that shaped the result, with West 
Germany supported by the Netherlands promot-
ing market liberalization. Unsurprisingly, there was 
resistance, with each of  the eight member states 
taking turns being labelled “the awkward partner.” 
France’s willingness in particular to object and 
threaten vetoes was the source of  much debate and 
led to its growing sense of  semi-detachment.
And yet, soon enough there were grounds for polit-
ical deepening, this time in the form of  another 
ambitious enlargement project. Despite “losing the 
UK,” renewed enlargement was driven powerfully 
by changes in the Mediterranean. Even the Brit-
ish government, sitting now in the European Free 
Trade Area and wary of  the EEC’s growing market 
size, supported EU membership for Greece, Por-
tugal, and Spain, recognizing that economic links 
alone would be insufficient to support political 
changes in these countries. This gave the EEC a 
significant opportunity to build its position as the 
predominant organization of  European politics.
Nevertheless, enlargement triggered bitter budget-
ary arguments – again mainly involving France – as 
European funds flowed southward. These tensions 
came to a head just as the Cold War reached its 
denouement. The reunification of  Germany and 
the applications for EEC membership from East-
ern Europe (strongly backed by the US, which was 
of  course keen to see the EEC compliment NATO 
Living Awkwardly Ever After: What If the British Had Voted to leave the 
European Economic Community in 1975?
Tim Oliver
Tim Oliver examines what the United Kingdom and the European Union might look like today had the 
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expansion) shifted Europe’s center eastward. In an 
ironic twist, France now became the member state 
most eager to bring Britain back into the EEC fold. 
For Paris was suddenly eager to counterbalance the 
new Germany and the eastward shift of  power.
The Alternative Britain: Fragmented and 
Interventionist
For British politics, the morning of  June 6, 1975 
was equally somber. For the government, this pol-
icy U-turn imposed by the public was a humiliation 
on par with the Suez Canal debacle of  1956. Har-
old Wilson’s subsequent resignation weakened the 
Labour party, already governing on a slim majority. 
But it was probably the leadership of  the center-
right Conservative party –the more pro-European 
of  the two main parties at the time– that was most 
damaged by the outcome. Even though they were 
not in power, many Tories saw the “no” vote as a 
personal defeat on an issue they considered central 
to Britain’s future.
The “no” added to a sense that Britain lacked 
direction, wracked as it was by high inflation, 
declining competitiveness, growing unemploy-
ment, increased strike activity and growing union 
militancy, constitutional uncertainty, and political 
fragmentation – not to mention social changes that 
many saw as evidence of  general moral decline. A 
spending crisis in 1976 forced the British govern-
ment to seek a £2.3 billion loan from the IMF. This 
in turn led some pro-Europeans to point to how, 
even outside the EEC, Britain’s sovereignty was as 
compromised as many of  the “out” campaigners 
had argued in the 1975 referendum.
In 1976 the UK reverted to membership in the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association. As an organization that 
had already failed to live up to its promise (real liber-
alization without the strictures of  political integration), 
it had lost Denmark and now consisted of  Austria, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and 
Switzerland. Britain continued to face the economic 
challenges of  the end of  empire and a shift of  trade 
toward Europe, albeit investing in new efforts to 
expand trade with non-European markets.
Just as such attempts had flatlined earlier, so too 
these ran into trouble. Britain’s non-European trad-
ing partners always seemed more interested in the 
EEC than EFTA. Similarly, Britain – along with the 
rest of  EFTA – still had to think about European 
markets more than any other. As a result, the issue 
of  Europe remained unsettled. Pro-Europeanism 
and Euroskepticism became increasingly powerful 
forces, both alert to the way developments in the 
rest of  Europe were shaping Britain. For pro-Euro-
peans, Britain’s inability to secure its interests was a 
continual source of  concern.
For Euroskeptics buoyed by the vote to withdraw, 
the growing power of  the EEC, its expanding eco-
nomic reach, and the pressure on Britain to “kow-
tow” to it were a continual source of  excitement. 
This Euroskepticism was matched by a strong 
strain of  anti-Americanism, reflecting uncertainty 
about Britain’s position in the world, its political 
economy, and its political and constitutional devel-
opment. Imagining British apartness from Europe 
became increasingly difficult, as economics, travel, 
sport, immigration, politics, and its unique position 
between Ireland and France meant otherwise.
EFTA and the EEC: Toward a Two-tier 
Europe
On June 7, 1975 Sir Michael Palliser, the first and 
soon to be last British permanent representative 
to the EEC, met with European Commission offi-
cials to begin negotiations for a UK withdrawal. It 
soon became clear that both sides held potentially 
irreconcilable positions. Britain hoped to open up 
discussion about EFTA – with the UK in the lead 
– entering into relations with the EEC on more or 
less equal footing. The EEC could not, however, 
allow any new relationship to compromise its own 
political integration. If  Britain or the EFTA wanted 
a relationship with the EEC, they would have to 
accept that this entailed political rather than merely 
economic relations, something British voters had 
clearly rejected.
Both sides faced a further dilemma. There was no 
denying that the UK played a central role in Euro-
pean politics, especially its security and transatlantic 
relations. Moreover, despite its label as the “sick 
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man of  Europe,” Britain’s economy remained one 
of  the world’s largest. Other members of  EFTA 
and the EEC also made clear their hopes for some 
new arrangement, an agenda that Ireland pushed 
for especially keenly. The British withdrawal had 
also raised questions in Brussels. If  the British 
could not feel at home in the political EEC, politi-
cians asked, did this bode well for future instances 
of  enlargement?
By the mid-1980s, the European Commission pro-
posed the creation of  a joint European Economic 
Area (EEA) as a means of  upgrading relations 
between the two blocs. Following resistance from 
the European Court of  Justice over shared decision 
making, which it argued would have compromised 
the EEC’s autonomy, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
paved the way for a formalized two-tier Europe. 
The outer ring was designed to balance a reunited 
Germany, with the inner core taking this role fur-
ther through currency union. Despite the promise 
of  greater political autonomy in the outer ring, 
Central European and most other EFTA states 
opted to join the inner circle instead. The UK 
remained in a dwindling group that eventually also 
included Turkey and Ukraine.
Referendum 2017: Déjà Vu for the EU
With this little counterfactual excursion behind us, 
it is time to draw lessons for future. The parallels 
between today and 1975 have not passed unnoticed. 
The basic question remains: can the UK shape its 
destiny more effectively by engaging in the Euro-
pean Union or by seeking a new relationship from 
the outside? In some respects the UK’s potential 
to renegotiate the terms of  its membership today 
is even smaller than it was in 1975. For the EU 
today comprises 28 states as opposed to nine in 
1975. Where the British once made up 21.7 percent 
of  the bloc’s population, today they are only 12.5 
percent.
In 1975 other European leaders also better appreci-
ated the political pressures under which the British 
prime minister found himself. Less so today, where 
the British context is hardly unusual. Moreover, the 
EU can offer less. Various ideas were put forward 
in the 1970s: renegotiation, the idea of  regional 
funds helping the UK’s poorest regions (a policy 
that proved important in later enlargements). 
Today’s budgetary constraints make such initiatives 
much less likely. And for the British, the EU no 
longer seems the attractive partner it was in the 
1970s, especially as emerging markets increasingly 
draw their attention.
It remains to be seen whether the EU and UK can 
bridge their differences. This “What if  …?” analy-
sis should nevertheless remind us that, just as in the 
wake of  the 1975 vote, either result of  a British in-
out referendum poses potentially difficult outcomes, 
both to the UK and to the EU. If  Britain again 
votes to stay in, it will nevertheless likely remain a 
Euroskeptic and awkward partner, creating tensions 
both within Britain and in the rest of  the EU. If  
Britain votes to leave, however, it will still remain 
closely bound to the EU – a partner that the rest 
of  the EU will have to struggle to ignore.
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The European debt crisis has shone an unforgiving 
light on the EU’s democratic deficit. The condi-
tions attached to the financial assistance programs 
for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus, and Spain 
have intruded deeply into the core of  national 
sovereignty, notably in issues like social protection. 
Even outside the crisis countries, the European 
Commission has been empowered to demand 
budgetary reforms from eurozone member states 
under fiscal surveillance mechanisms. On the other 
side, creditor countries like Germany have had to 
grant substantial resources to bailout funds such 
as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). With 
such deep intrusions into citizens’ lives, the need 
for democratic legitimacy is clear, and it is national 
parliaments that are increasingly presented as key 
to solving this problem. With their claim of  repre-
senting EU citizens directly, they are the new go-to 
solution for all the EU’s democratic woes. One 
therefore cannot help but ask the burning ques-
tion: what if  national parliaments had had a stron-
ger role in eurozone decision making? Would EU 
crisis management have been substantially more 
legitimate?
After years boosting the European Parliament 
(EP), most suggestions for increasing the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy now mention the need for 
strengthening national parliaments institutionally. 
Three ideas have been discussed most intensely. 
First, as a logical counterbalance to the increas-
ingly intergovernmental modes of  coordinating 
economic governance, MPs in Germany called for 
the creation of  a new assembly of  national par-
liamentarians to exchange views and jointly scru-
tinize eurozone governments. Second, as voiced 
for instance in the report of  the president of  the 
European Council on the deepening of  economic 
monetary union (EMU), an interparliamentary 
assembly composed both of  national and Euro-
pean Parliament deputies is being proposed. Finally, 
national parliaments are supposed to gain a more 
direct say in decision making, gaining a joint veto 
over EU legislation (“red card”). The UK govern-
ment in particular has called for this third idea.
Rarely if  ever have the proponents of  these ideas 
asked whether they would have solved the prob-
lems of  the past. In most cases, the answer is no.
This is clear from a retrospective analysis of  the 
EU’s financial assistance programs. For instance, 
the intervention in Cyprus in early 2013 was par-
ticularly sensitive due to the high costs involved for 
bank customers on the island. Although the Cyprus 
program had its political and economic peculiarities, 
it shared basic decision-making flaws with the pre-
vious programs for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain. In principle, all of  these programs were sup-
posed to be decided upon by the eurozone heads 
of  state and government (Euro Summit), worked 
out by the Eurogroup, and implemented by the 
so-called Troika (the IMF, the European Commis-
sion, and the ECB), on the legal basis of  a request 
by the government of  the respective member state. 
The political reality was, however, different. Due to 
pressures on financial markets as well as the need 
for immediate and decisive action, national govern-
ments like that of  Cyprus were more or less forced 
into accepting financial assistance.
In these dramatic circumstances, political and 
financial pressures trumped domestic institutional 
checks, so that an upgrade of  the national parlia-
ment, let alone interparliamentary cooperation, 
would not have had a decisive democratic impact. 
The Cypriot parliament, like other national parlia-
ments, did have a veto over ESM support for the 
Mediterranean island, indeed making use of  it to 
protest the involvement of  small bank account 
holders and turning down an initial package offer. 
However, as financial pressure intensified and a 
Facing up to Democratic Deficiencies: What If National Parliaments had 
Robust Euro Governance Powers at Their Disposal?
Nicolai von Ondarza
Nicolai von Ondarza examines which parliamentary body best represents national interests on eurozone 
issues at the European level .
DGAPanalyse 19 | October 2014
20
new package was forged, the Cypriot parliament 
had little real scope for questioning this second, 
and in some ways even worse, deal for an ESM 
program. The same lack of  choice, moreover, 
applies to parliaments of  creditor countries whose 
parliaments, like the supposedly powerful German 
Bundestag, legally retained sovereignty over their 
country’s participation in the Cyprus program. 
Faced with the same supposed choice of  either 
accepting the intergovernmental deal or risking the 
financial stability of  the eurozone, all of  them gave 
their formal consent.
Now, what if  an interparliamentary assembly 
for economic and monetary union – the EMU 
Assembly – had been established at the start of  
the European debt crisis? What if  an assembly of  
MPs and MEPs of  the kind envisaged in Article 
13 of  the Fiscal Compact were in place? Taking 
into account the experience with COSAC (the 
network of  national EU committees) and the new 
interparliamentary assembly for common security 
and defense policy, it is hardly likely that the EMU 
assembly would have convened on time to affect 
the assistance programs. Nor does this look set to 
change anytime soon. In October 2013 the first 
meeting of  a new interparliamentary assembly for 
economic and social affairs failed even to agree 
on its composition and tasks, let alone political 
recommendations. If  this was the case during a 
relatively peaceful period, there is a scant chance 
of  its agreeing on substantial conclusions under 
crisis conditions. Apart from anything else, its 
focus would likely be on ensuring the exchange of  
information between parliaments trying to control 
their own governments rather than forming joint 
positions.
A different picture emerges from the measures 
implemented under the EU’s “ordinary legislative 
procedure” which involves the full consent of  the 
European Parliament. The “two pack” legislation, 
for instance, greatly strengthened budgetary surveil-
lance, trespassing very clearly on the primary right 
of  national parliaments: their power of  the purse. 
Here a veto for national parliaments would have 
strengthened their position in the establishment 
of  these mechanisms. This would not only have 
complicated an already very difficult legislative pro-
cedure but would also in effect have been undemo-
cratic; a minority of  MPs in a single EU national 
parliament could have held the whole Union hos-
tage, thus undermining the very tenet of  (qualified) 
majority decision making and the role of  the Euro-
pean Parliament. National parliaments understand 
this and explicitly chose not even to make use of  
their collective right to express their dislike of  “the 
two pack” under subsidiarity procedures (“yellow 
card”).
In short, an EMU Assembly might provide a useful 
forum for national parliamentarians to inform and 
consult each other about budgetary developments 
in their home countries, but it would lack the cohe-
sion to decisively engage with the Council and 
the Commission in detailed negotiations on EU 
legislation. This should come as no surprise. Inter-
parliamentary assemblies are by their very nature 
consultative with little impact on actual policy mak-
ing. An interparliamentary assembly with greater 
powers would thus raise popular expectations, draw 
power away from the European Parliament as the 
body best able to counter the Council and control 
the Commission, and potentially increase political 
tensions. An EMU Assembly comprised only of  
parliamentarians from eurozone countries would 
probably deepen the rift in the EU between euro-
zone and non-eurozone member states. This is 
particularly important, as many issues of  economic 
governance – such as the European Semester, the 
two pack, and banking union – also affect non-
eurozone states such as Poland and Sweden.
If  strengthening national parliaments (as currently 
discussed at the EU level) would not have solved 
the democratic issues raised during the debt crisis, 
is the Union therefore doomed to its democratic 
deficit? No, but it is also clear that European and 
domestic actors – parliaments, governments, the 
Commission – should look beyond legalistic insti-
tutional solutions to resolve the issue of  demo-
cratic legitimacy. The first important insight from 
this hypothetical perspective is that purely formal 
paths for democratic legitimacy will not suffice at 
crunch times when politics and markets triumph 
over structures. On the contrary: a successful eco-
nomic resurgence is the sine qua non condition for 
regaining the most important aspect of  democratic 
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legitimacy: trust in the political system. The most 
important factor in regaining public trust and sup-
port therefore lies in its output legitimacy, in partic-
ular a convincing strengthening of  the eurozone’s 
economies without further social upheaval.
The second insight from the analysis is that, while 
national parliaments can provide an additional 
source of  legitimacy, they are constantly outplayed 
politically by national leaders and their closed-door 
deals in the European Council and the new Euro 
Summits. An effective democratic element within 
decision making on the European level will prove 
possible only if  parliamentarians organize them-
selves on the same level as the intergovernmental 
Euro Summits and the Eurogroup – that is, the 
European level. MPs might achieve this by improv-
ing the flow of  information between them and 
thus improving national scrutiny mechanisms. But 
it is the European Parliament which, with all its 
flaws, remains the only parliamentary player with 
the ability and track record to confront member 
states directly in the Council. Instead of  empow-
ering national parliaments to take on a role they 
cannot fulfill, the European Parliament should 
therefore be given a stronger position in the areas 
that currently matter most to European politics: 
economic governance and eurozone management.
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A decade ago in Ukraine, protests triggered elec-
tions and a change of  leadership. Led by Viktor 
Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, pro-European 
forces took over key political positions, fuelling 
interest in integration with the EU among Ukrai-
nian elites and within society as a whole. Russian 
influence and the Russian model waned, and sup-
port for EU-inspired reforms was high, despite 
widespread awareness of  the painful trade-offs in 
the short- to medium-term. There was even talk 
of  a potential ripple effect across the whole post-
Soviet region.
But EU members resisted offering Ukraine an 
explicit membership perspective. Brussels was 
focused on Ukraine’s technical compliance, and 
the then EU-25 had little interest in integrating 
yet another “problem country.” Soon enough, the 
Orange Revolution forfeited its reputation as an 
expression of  an active civil society, as its leaders 
showed themselves to be typical Ukrainian politi-
cians in pursuit of  their own interests. Change 
stalled, and frustration about the EU and politics 
in general increased across Ukrainian society. The 
governments of  EU member states felt vindicated.
Today, however, commentators increasingly rue the 
fact that the EU missed its opportunity in 2004 to 
reinforce the new dynamic in Ukrainian politics 
and achieve a breakthrough in the reform process. 
Had the EU offered a membership candidacy 
coupled with immediate benefits (like easing visa 
restrictions for the required reforms), Ukraine’s 
civil society would have been strengthened. This 
would in turn have strengthened the EU, keep-
ing up the momentum for change. This argument 
is often heard in the current debate, especially in 
the aftermath of  the failure in November 2013 to 
conclude a trade deal with the country. But does it 
hold?
A Membership Perspective for the Orange Revolu-
tionaries: The EU’s Missed Opportunity?
2004 was indeed the first time in Ukraine’s post-
Soviet history that both its elites and society as a 
whole shared a serious interest in EU integration 
and were willing to accept the attendant condi-
tions, to bear the stick of  fundamental reform in 
exchange for the carrot of  membership perspec-
tive. But Ukraine’s new leaders were too weak to 
implement such reforms and the EU’s membership 
perspective would have been simply too demanding. 
Today the narrative is very appealing: a member-
ship perspective provides the incentive needed for 
reform. However in the case of  Ukraine it would 
have resulted in broken promises on both sides. 
What the EU needed back then was instead to 
establish for Ukraine a strong mechanism of  incen-
tives and engagement that nonetheless fell below 
the level of  membership.
In the absence of  such a mechanism, the reform-
ist agenda lost momentum. The once-united 
Orange front split into rival camps. Finally, in 
2010, Viktor Yanukovych, who had lost the 2004 
election, exacted his revenge by winning the pres-
idential election. This was a failure not just of  the 
Ukrainian elites but of  the EU itself. While the 
leaders of  the Orange Revolution had certainly 
stumbled over their own egoism, the EU had 
misunderstood the role that was being demanded 
of  it and had ignored the reality of  post-Soviet 
politics. After all, it was not the ruling elite that 
would bring change but Ukrainian society itself, 
and this civil society needed finally to grasp 
its power. As it turned out, Ukraine’s political 
elites have no interest in fundamental economic 
and political reform, as it would challenge their 
privileges.
Coyly Courting Ukraine: What If the EU Had Offered its Neighbor a 
Membership Perspective in 2004?
Stefan Meister
Stefan Meister examines the “lost-opportunities” argument and presents a three-pronged strategy for 
drawing Ukraine closer to the EU . The manuscript was completed in January 2014 .
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Since 2010, of  course, the EU has tried to beef  up 
its engagement, while remaining below the level of  
offering Ukraine a membership perspective. It has 
done so within the framework of  the negotiations 
on a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement 
(DCFTA), which was put on the in 1999. Yet the 
discussion in the EU quickly became stuck in a rut, 
increasingly focused on questions of  condition-
ality – in particular, the condition of  Tymoshenko’s 
release from prison. And while the EU formulated 
with Kiev the most ambitious free-trade agreement 
in the EU’s history, it failed to provide a way to 
actually implement it with Ukraine’s reform-resis-
tant elites. Certainly for Yanukovych, an opaque 
political and legal environment was more lucrative 
than a normative framework dictated by the EU, 
and Tymoshenko’s release would have posed a chal-
lenge to his reelection in 2015.
Indeed, Yanukovych’s interest in the DCFTA was 
motivated above all by his desire to balance two 
opposing pressures – on the one hand, a section of  
the Ukrainian elite and general society agitating for 
further integration with the EU, and on the other a 
section militating for Russia. The DCFTA seemed 
the perfect tool for squeezing credits from Russia 
in a tight economic situation. And such manoeu-
vers by Ukrainian elites in turn reinforced the 
presumption on the EU side that failure to “win 
Ukraine” would push the country into the Russian 
sphere of  influence. In reality, Ukraine’s elites have 
no interest in ceding sovereignty to Russia, prefer-
ring to play the EU and Russia against each other. 
And it is the renewed Russian pressure that has 
become the main force driving Ukrainians into the 
pro-EU camp today.
As recent events have shown, the EU has no cause 
for complacency. In other geopolitical contexts, the 
EU’s lack of  preparation and clarity might have 
been unproblematic, but for a country wedged 
between the EU and Russia, its policy left plenty 
of  leeway for the Kremlin to destabilize Ukraine. 
Today, the EU can only build its leverage over the 
Ukrainian elites if  it puts an offer on the table 
that dispels the understandable doubts about the 
Union’s seriousness and makes clear that Ukrainian 
politicians are responsible for their society’s lack of  
fulfillment.
Breaking the Circle: Form Follows Function
In January 2014 the EU found itself  dealing with a 
Ukrainian president with his back to the wall and a 
Ukrainian society frustrated by indecisive European 
engagement and the lack of  a political alternative 
at home. To many Ukrainians, European priorities 
appear to be skewed and even hypocritical, focused 
on freeing an opposition politician, Tymoshenko, 
who is seen as neither a democrat nor a reliable 
politician. The approach seemed to confirm that 
the EU has no interest in integrating Ukraine. 
Brussels, moreover, became bogged down in a 
struggle with Russia for which it was not prepared. 
True, Russia has no roadmap to modernize the 
region and offers no real model for Ukraine or its 
other Eastern neighbors. But the struggle between 
the two actors sends unfortunate signals to elites 
across the Eastern neighborhood.
In all this, the debate in EU capitals at the start 
of  this tumultuous year for Ukraine was more 
about form than function. Commentators rued the 
“missed opportunity” of  2004 and presented the 
membership perspective as a panacea. Instead, they 
have asked – and should continue to ask –what 
functions and demands the EU approach should 
fulfill, and only then whether a membership per-
spective would be suitable. With this in mind, the 
EU should apply the following three-pronged 
strategy:
First, offer a clear “integration perspective” to 
Ukraine. The EU must make up its mind about 
what kind of  relationship it wants with Ukraine. 
The basic rationale should be obvious. Even if  the 
EU is still struggling with a messy internal debate 
about the emergence of  a euro-core and with the 
aftermath of  previous rounds of  enlargement, it 
must see that the promotion of  security, stability, 
and democracy in the Eastern neighborhood is a 
vital interest. Moreover, the EU’s internal debate 
about different speeds and circles of  integration 
actually broadens the scope for Ukraine’s integra-
tion. The current reforms of  EU internal and 
foreign policy should therefore also include new 
integration frameworks for all Eastern neighbors. 
Still, this potentially complex new arrangement 
should be driven by clarity about the EU’s vision 
DGAPanalyse 19 | October 2014
25
for itself  and the region or it will become the basis 
for compromises with elites that undermine the 
Union’s credibility.
Second, stop posing unwitting conditions on 
Ukraine. As the debate about the signing of  the 
DCFTA and Association Agreement shows, the 
release of  Yulia Tymoshenko should never have 
been the main condition. The EU should rather 
focus on the “hidden conditionality” of  whether 
the agreement actually has a chance to be imple-
mented. Signature of  the DCFTA can only be the 
beginning of  a difficult process. In order to change 
the situation in Ukraine sustainably, clear criteria 
and benchmarks need to be defined and a monitor-
ing mechanism put in place so that success can be 
rewarded and failure be punished. The EU’s clos-
est modernization partner in this is Ukrainian civil 
society. Its actors have real interest in better living 
conditions and in a functional public sphere that 
does not serve the interests of  a small group but 
rather of  the broader public. Change will not come 
from outside. Ukrainians understand that only they 
have the power to change the country.
Third, focus on economic support before liberal-
ization. The EU needs to help Ukraine resolve its 
economic crisis. Until the end of  2014, Ukraine 
will have to pay back foreign debts of  $10.8 bil-
lion, while predictions of  zero-percent growth have 
caused its foreign reserves to fall to around $19.7 
billion. The EU is unprepared, even unable, to 
fulfill these expectations. There is, however, scope 
for a greater role for the EU in modernizing the 
Ukrainian economy if  the EU develops technical 
instruments and a clear communication strategy. 
This would make both the conditions for financial 
support as well as the failure of  the government to 
fulfill them more transparent.
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With the Cyprus question still in apparent gridlock, it 
is a patch of  recent history that has been strangely 
forgotten. On April 24, 2004, the clear majority of  
Turkish Cypriots (65 percent) voted to reunify with 
the Greek Cypriot majority and to create a new 
Republic of  Cyprus in order to join the EU. This vote 
took place under the United Nations’ Annan Plan and 
was backed by the EU, the US, Turkey, and even the 
government of  Greece. Against everyone’s expecta-
tions, however, the Greek Cypriots voted overwhelm-
ingly (76 percent) against the settlement.
In principle the EU should have suspended the acces-
sion process until the island was reunited. This would 
have been in keeping with the Union’s own rules 
about unresolved border problems. But, partly due to 
Greece’s support for Cyprus and partly due to past 
intransigence on the part of  the Turkish side, the EU 
had already allowed Cyprus to sign a Treaty of  Acces-
sion a year before. There was no legal way out with-
out stopping the whole ten-country eastern expansion 
that was set to take place the following week. Instead, 
the EU offered Turkish Cypriots small compensation 
for the great blow dealt to them: the right to export 
tax-free to EU markets. This effort ultimately failed.
Greek Cypriots used their new EU membership to 
block this “direct trade” gesture. Despite this, Turkey 
remained determined to continue its own EU acces-
sion process. In part because of  Turkey’s positive 
contribution to the efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue, 
the EU accepted a starting date of  October 2005 
for negotiations on Turkish entry. And yet, Ankara 
did block the expansion of  the Turkish-EU customs 
union to Greek Cypriots, in response to the way the 
EU had bowed to Greek Cypriot pressure and backed 
down from implementing direct trade with Turkish 
Cypriots. By 2009, half  of  Turkey’s EU negotiating 
chapters were stuck behind this roadblock. That situa-
tion persists today.
The Alternative Cyprus Dynamic: Trade First
So, what if  – as some hoped at the time – the EU, 
and particularly the Nordic states, had stood its 
ground in 2005 on behalf  of  the Turkish Cypri-
ots? One can imagine that their determined stance 
might have attracted supporters, including the UK 
and southern member states keen to have more 
of  a voice in an EU dominated by Germany and 
France. Together they could well have managed to 
force through the direct-trade measure for Turkish 
Cypriots.
Such action to preserve the integrity of  the EU’s 
enlargement policy would have looked minor and 
rear-guard at the time, given the prize already won 
by Cyprus and Greece. But implementation of  
direct trade for Turkish Cypriots would in fact 
have made all the difference. Turkey’s willingness 
to trade with Greek Cypriots would have increased. 
And after some nervous hiccups, trade, air traffic, 
and trust would have begun to expand between 
Turkey and the Republic of  Cyprus.
The island’s low-cost package-tour hotels, long 
out of  fashion for most Europeans, could well 
have attracted a new generation of  Turkish tour-
ists (just as the Aegean Sea islands have been 
wowing upmarket Turkish visitors since Turkish-
Greek relations were normalized in 1999). Greek 
Cypriots would have quickly oriented themselves 
to Istanbul, not least thanks to poles of  attraction 
like the ecumenical Greek Orthodox patriarch of  
Constantinople. (This, by the way, is not pure sci-
ence fiction: the signs are actually there today in 
Cyprus. Despite bitter official condemnation of  
the “illegal” Turkish Cypriot airport, each week 
thousands of  Greek Cypriots use it and even fly 
on Turkish air carriers for less expensive travel 
through Istanbul to the rest of  the world. A hand-
ful of  Greek-Cypriot pilots even work for Turkish 
Airlines.)
Seizing the Moment: What If the EU Had Bridged the Cypriot Divide?
Hugh Pope
Hugh Pope imagines what Cyprus could look like today if the EU had taken a stand to promote trade with 
the north after the failed reunification vote and the south’s subsequent one-sided accession in to the EU 
in 2005 .
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Trade would also have boomed as Greek Cypriots 
took advantage of  low supermarket prices in the 
north of  the island, thanks to imports from Turkey. 
The large Cyprus-registered tanker fleet would have 
taken its share of  activity at the Turkish oil pipeline 
terminal at Ceyhan. At the same time, the Greek 
Cypriot neighborhood of  Nicosia would have 
experienced a rapid inflow of  representative offices 
of  international companies doing business in the 
Turkish market and elsewhere in the region. They 
would have been attracted to Cyprus’s low-tax, 
low-cost business base with a wide pool of  well-
educated Turkish and English speakers and quick 
local air connections.
Politics Follows
After five years of  such trade, the change of  politi-
cal atmosphere would have been remarkable. As 
trust on the part of  Greek Cypriots rose, their 
media would have shown more openness to the 
idea of  a reaching compromise settlement. Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish officials would have stopped 
scoring points against each other – no longer set-
ting out unilateral, maximalist dreams or frittering 
away the years in UN talks of  full federation that 
polls show neither side really wants. They would 
have begun talking about what they were actually 
ready to accept.
Indeed it would not have been surprising if  all 
sides had finally shown a little flexibility, entering 
into talks without already having committed to a 
particular outcome. After all, the negotiators have 
long known that any settlement will look pretty 
much like today’s status quo, coming somewhere 
between a light federation and a two-state solution.
At the very least, Greek Cypriots, no longer so fear-
ful of  Turkey, might have made a key concession. 
They might have more easily accepted the idea 
that, if  the two sides really were to try a federal 
arrangement, the Turkish Cypriots could have the 
right to a “prenuptial agreement.” Such an arrange-
ment (specifying that the Turkish Cypriots would 
have sovereign rights if  the federal system broke 
down) would have given the Turkish Cypriots a 
safety net, allaying their fears of  being trapped in 
an abusive relationship or of  any new federation 
breaking down in bloodshed (as it did in the 1960s). 
In today’s real world, Greek Cypriots fear that a 
“prenup” would see them sleepwalk into a separate 
state. But Turkish Cypriots have a de facto state 
already, and a Greek Cypriot concession on such 
an agreement would encourage them to negotiate 
more sincerely on a federal package.
Pursuing the scenario further: Turkish leaders, 
newly able to communicate openly with and gain 
some trust from the Greek Cypriot side, might 
have pointed out that if  Nicosia would go a step 
further and agree to a two-state settlement, Ankara 
would withdraw all troops and drop its demand for 
guaranteed oversight of  the Greek Cypriot zone. 
They might perhaps even have offered to give up 
more territory than that gained by the traditional 
offer to shrink the Turkish Cypriot zone from 37 
percent to 29 percent of  the island. Going further, 
it is likely they would also have accepted that the 
natural gas-rich territorial waters off  the southern 
part of  the island would be placed fully under 
Greek Cypriot ownership, a gesture that would 
have constituted valuable compensation for Greek 
Cypriots’ sense of  grievance about losing the north 
of  the island.
The Turkish Cypriots’ own condition for this two-
state settlement would likely have been a guarantee 
that the 300,000 people now living legally in the 
Turkish Cypriot zone – whatever their origin – 
would have the right to citizenship in an indepen-
dent state and that this new state would have the 
right to start negotiating for EU membership. In 
this two-state case, Turkish Cypriots might in fact 
have had fewer reservations about Greek Cypriots’ 
right to buy new property in the north than they 
would under a federal arrangement. A two-state 
settlement would also have marked a clean break 
with the past, allowing for clear rules about com-
pensation for lost property. (Greek Cypriots have 
title to three-quarters of  the land in the north, 
while Turkish Cypriots have title to a tenth of  the 
land in the south.)
Picture a northern Cypriot state under the EU 
umbrella. A greater sense of  Turkish Cypriot con-
fidence would have allowed for a more imagina-
tive future for the ghost resort of  Varosha, which 
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would likely have been handed back to the Greek 
Cypriot side in any version of  a settlement. A pub-
lic company – much like Lebanon’s Solidere, which 
rebuilt the war-wrecked heart of  Beirut – could 
have proposed to take over the whole area, demol-
ishing the many unusable structures and rebuilding 
the beach resort so that it could take its place once 
again as Cyprus’s premier tourist destination. Exist-
ing owners would have been issued shares in the 
overall enterprise, as would those who financed the 
rebuilding. Turkish international contracting com-
panies would have been natural bidders for much 
of  the work.
With a better atmosphere on the island of  Cyprus, 
the group of  smaller EU states that saved the day 
in 2005 might also have been able to take a lead in 
ensuring that the EU-Turkey relationship stayed on 
course, staging interventions in both Ankara and 
Brussels to build communication and trust. Even 
more importantly, it could have created a sense of  
common purpose to block the trend of  suborning 
EU policies like enlargement to narrow national 
interests. Choosing their battles carefully, the group 
might have been able to mobilize a critical mass of  
member states on issues of  common moral inter-
est, especially when crises threatened stability in 
the Middle East and North Africa. Indeed some 
might have come to believe that this 2005 Cyprus 
moment marked the point where the EU at last 
learned to fill the supranational role that its found-
ing fathers had hoped and planned for.
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The widespread assumption that the EU is now 
somehow entering terra incognita begs a compari-
son with 1990, because in many ways history is 
repeating itself: European leaders are once again 
confronted with profound political changes – then 
the fall of  the Berlin Wall and German unifica-
tion, today the sovereign debt crisis and Germany’s 
seeming dominance in crisis management. And 
once again, their supposedly far-reaching solutions 
are in fact simply catching missed opportunities: 
the Maastricht Treaty claimed to prepare the EU 
for its future in an undivided Europe, while actually 
dealing with issues that had been on the table for 
a decade, including monetary union; today’s crisis 
management for its part simply fixes long-familiar 
weaknesses in implementation of  that union.
One key thing has changed however: the role of  
Germany. At both times, of  course, Germany has 
been pivotal. The Maastricht Treaty was driven by 
a need to reconfirm Germany’s commitment to 
European integration. Today’s stronger eurozone 
governance is a precondition for Berlin’s commit-
ment to crisis management. However, the tables 
have turned. Back in 1990 Germany needed the 
approval and consent of  its EU partners in the 
process of  unification. Now, by contrast, the EU 
needs Germany’s approval and consent to move 
forward. This shift is also key to the debate about 
political union. Whereas in 1990, the parallel inter-
governmental conference (IGC) held on political 
union was geared toward binding Germany into 
Europe, today political union has become one of  a 
series of  sequenced conditions posed by Germany 
for its further engagement.
Berlin seems skeptical about the scope that a “big-
bang” type of  shift would have, pointing to popular 
intolerance of  grandiose European ideas. Pursuing 
a “what if ” scenario points to different lessons, 
however. If  political union had been achieved at 
Maastricht in a big bang twenty years ago we would 
have seen very different results. The EU would 
not have been shielded from today’s profound 
crisis, nor would it necessarily have been better 
prepared in institutional terms. But the integration-
ist momentum, once achieved, would have made it 
easier for member states today to accept the impli-
cations of  crisis response. Today they would be 
less constrained by the successive renegotiations of  
Maastricht’s “loose ends,” more confident in their 
strength, and more demanding of  countries seeking 
to join. In short, it is not big bangs that alienate the 
public. Rather, it is the piecemeal efforts to make 
up for lost opportunities.
Revisiting the Last Debate on Political 
Union
Almost thirty years ago, the European Community 
waved goodbye to a decade of  stagnation. The 
1970s had wrought profound changes on the EU, 
both in economic and political terms. Europe had 
been made to look weak in the wake of  the world’s 
first major energy crisis, rising structural unem-
ployment, exchange-rate turbulence, and shrink-
ing competitiveness vis-à-vis the United States 
and East Asia. Moreover, it had lost influence in 
international affairs due to the incoherence of  its 
foreign policy action and a litany of  flimsy dec-
larations. Against this backdrop, several attempts 
had been made to define a reform of  politics and 
institutions, many of  them ambitious, like the 1970 
Werner Plan for monetary policy or the1975 Tinde-
mans Report on institutions.
Alas, none of  them gained traction. Divisions 
among member states, reluctance to make a leap 
forward, and some rather sobering tactics pur-
sued by member states and the US stood in the 
way of  change. The turnaround only came when 
three actors moved into key positions: François 
Thinking Big: What If EU Leaders Had Been Bold Enough to Create 
European Political Union at Maastricht?
Josef Janning
Josef Janning rues the chance to complete political union squandered by the EU-12 in the wake of 
German reunification .
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Mitterrand was elected French president in 1981; 
Helmut Kohl became German chancellor in 1982; 
and Jacques Delors took over as president of  the 
European Commission in 1985. The Solemn Dec-
laration on European Union of  1983 (leading three 
years later to the Single European Act) marked the 
first step, followed in 1985 by the white paper on 
the single market and the establishment of  a com-
mittee in 1988 headed by Delors to develop the 
scheme of  an economic and monetary union.
All of  this was underway when a power-sharing 
agreement between the Polish Communist Party 
and the Solidarity trade union was negotiated in 
Warsaw and when leading politicians of  both coun-
tries cut the barbed wire on the Austro-Hungarian 
border the following summer. The Berlin Wall fell 
on November 9, 1989.
Under the new circumstances, economic and mon-
etary union (EMU) – which was already scheduled 
for an IGC by the end of  1990 – assumed an entirely 
new relevance as the most visible means of  binding 
Germany to the EU. Although it is widely held that 
Mitterrand’s primary goal with EMU was to break the 
dominance of  the German Bundesbank, he ended 
up accepting its status and operating philosophy as 
the model for the European Central Bank. And while 
Kohl’s successful attempt to open a parallel IGC on 
political union was read as a sly move to delay or 
dilute progress on EMU, the chancellor ended up put-
ting a range of  issues on the table to strengthen com-
munity institutions and enhance democratic legitimacy 
that were also relevant for other founding member 
states.
The targets for political union, as defined in two mes-
sages by Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand of  
April and of  December 1990, were ambitious:
• Beyond the fiscal dimension of  EMU, the cre-
ation of  new powers on the European level 
for environmental protection, social and health 
policies, energy, research and technology; the 
extension of  the community method to matters 
of  internal security, immigration, asylum, and 
organized crime
• A genuine foreign and security policy, focused 
on neighboring regions to the east and south; 
inclusion of  developmental aid and assistance; 
integration of  the Western EU into political 
union; the gradual replacement of  consensus 
rule by majority voting on matters of  foreign 
and security policy
• More efficient decision making through the 
introduction of  qualified majority voting as the 
standard procedure in the Council of  Ministers, 
with exceptions listed explicitly in the treaties
• A strengthening of  democratic legitimacy 
through the introduction of  co-decision with 
the European Parliament as the rule; confirma-
tion of  the president of  the European Commis-
sion by the European Parliament; establishment 
of  European citizenship; and the definition of  a 
role for national parliaments
An Alternative Maastricht
If  all of  the above had been achieved at Maastricht 
(rather than via three more wearisome treaty revisions, 
which still left a mound of  unfinished business), the 
EU would now have twenty years of  practical experi-
ence with political union under its belt. European 
political leaders would also have converged around 
the conclusions Mitterrand drew up after the fall of  
the Berlin Wall, namely that a united Germany’s new 
ambition and power required a serious deepening of  
European integration. This mind set was evidently 
lacking in Italy and Spain, not to mention in the 
United Kingdom. Political leaders of  the BENELUX 
countries acknowledged the need for convergence, 
but only reluctantly.
Achieving political union at Maastricht would 
have sped up the development of  climate policies, 
brought about a common internal and external 
energy policy, prepared the EU to respond bet-
ter to the social implications of  the single market 
and EMU, spared Europe its lost decade in the 
so-called three pillar structure, and educated the 
European Parliament on how to scrutinize gov-
ernment effectively under the co-decision rules. 
Neighborhood policy would have been practiced 
by the EU many years ahead of  the 2004 eastern 
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enlargement, when it was finally conceived in the 
real world. Security and defense matters would 
have become EU dossiers much earlier. And, of  
course, the UK would have had to face its Hamlet 
question – whether to be or not to be in the EU – 
much sooner.
Had there been consensus over the two unions, 
economic and monetary union and political union, 
“reinforced cooperation” might never have been 
invented. Indeed the whole notion of  a differenti-
ated integration might have appeared only with 
eastern enlargement and been associated more with 
staggered integration than with a two-tier EU. That 
said, enlargement to incorporate EFTA countries 
(Austria, Sweden, and Finland) might have been 
delayed because of  the EU’s enhanced role in its 
members’ internal and external affairs, and enlarge-
ment to the east would have been more divisive 
in the newly-independent countries because of  
the sovereignty implications. The EFTA states 
would have struggled to reconcile EU security and 
defense policy with their neutral or non-aligned sta-
tus, and the easterners would have had to explain 
the EU’s Franco-German core (with its echoes of  
Soviet domination) to their citizens. And yet, it 
would not have blocked enlargement: the case for 
membership was just too strong.
Would timely political union alongside economic 
and monetary union have prevented the current 
crisis in the eurozone? And, if  not, would it at 
least have equipped the EU with better means to 
respond? The answer to both questions is probably 
no. Although the specter of  asymmetric shocks 
was taken into account during the IGCs, none of  
the relevant scenarios imagined a profound crisis 
of  globalized financial markets, nor the massive 
expansion of  public debt across the EU that was 
needed in order to prevent a major depression. 
The inherent contradictions between a no-bail-out 
clause in EMU and the solidarity argument implicit 
in political union would not have been understood 
or anticipated.
Still, European integration is just as subject to path 
dependency as other political systems are, and this 
can have positive as well as negative effects. Suc-
cess on both projects at Maastricht, swift ratifica-
tion of  the treaty, and two decades of  practice 
would have constrained the bazaar mentality that 
shaped the negotiations at Nice, could well have 
curtailed the rise of  today’s intergovernmentalism, 
and thus might have better prepared member states 
to conceive assistance schemes for eurozone coun-
tries in need. Thus, if  political union had succeeded 
at Maastricht, the emergence of  a cost/benefit 
approach to European integration might have been 
hindered, delayed, or conceived in a different, more 
collective way.
To be sure, a thorough success in union building at 
Maastricht would not have spelled the end of  treaty 
change or IGCs. Take foreign and security policy. 
The ideas then for political union, while ambitious 
in scope (particularly on the integration of  defense), 
were sketchy on process and institutions. Current 
structures may be far from satisfactory to many 
member states, but they are quite some way ahead 
of  the avant-garde thinking of  1990. And yet, the 
problem with today’s structures lies largely in a lack 
of  political will and a surfeit of  gradualism – this 
would not have been the case with a big-bang 
approach. With the peace dividend now thoroughly 
consumed, it is all the more difficult to invest in 
common structures, institutions, and capabilities. 
After Maastricht, EU security and defense policies 
have rather followed NATO’s renationalization 
track than counterbalancing it.
Had political union succeeded at Maastricht, the 
EU would be a different beast today, not least 
because it would have been capable of  changing 
the course of  international events. Maastricht was 
a parting of  ways, the significance of  which was 
not seen or understood at the time. The treaty 
contained elements of  what political union should 
have been, but the Union it created was limping 
badly. Monetary union became the major point of  
controversy in many public debates after Maas-
tricht. At that point, European policy makers devel-
oped the fatal habit of  overselling the results of  
their horse trading. Maastricht essentially dealt with 
the reform agenda of  the 1980s and did not fin-
ish it in spite of  the momentum generated by the 
fall of  the Berlin Wall. For another decade, reform 
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ambitions centered around the “loose ends” of  
Maastricht, as public support for a leap forward 
gradually fell apart.
Conclusions: Too Little Sovereignty to Pool?
The history of  political union provides two lessons 
for today’s politicians. The first is about trajec-
tory. Integration is a track, and its course is not 
easily changed. It rarely gives an opportunity to 
correct past choices, especially those not taken. In 
the current setting, a comprehensive deepening of  
integration across major policy issues seems much 
harder than in 1990. The baggage of  past choices, 
developments, and trends is weighing down gov-
ernments. The second lesson is about seizing the 
moment. Shifts in the geopolitical environment 
open up opportunities for deeper integration that 
are out of  reach under less charged circumstances. 
If  the Maastricht Treaty had followed through on 
Mitterrand’s impulses, it would have helped the EU 
and its member states avoid the integration fatigue 
that arose from ten subsequent years of  tying up 
loose ends.
A closing thought: it seems ironic that deeper polit-
ical integration was sought in 1990 at a moment 
when national sovereignty reemerged from the con-
straints of  Cold War confrontation. And it seems 
odder still that it is not pursued in today’s situation, 
where the de facto loss of  sovereignty has become 
so obvious. Maybe in 1990 there was too much 
sovereignty around to achieve full political union. 
In 2014 there’s not enough sovereignty to try.
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It is an intriguing thought: imagine what Europe 
would look like had the Federal Republic of  Yugo-
slavia not disintegrated but instead merely shed its 
“Socialist” prefix. It would have spared the societ-
ies of  what are today Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, 
and Slovenia hundreds of  thousands of  dead. The 
European Union would not have looked so divided 
and impotent in the face of  the slaughter on its 
doorstep. And the US would not have had to send 
soldiers to fight on European soil for the first time 
since World War II. In short, the region could have 
been a “better place” – an assertion with which 
many citizens of  the now-independent successor 
states would concur.
Of  course, the entry of  this hypothetically united 
Yugoslavia into the EU would have meant a num-
ber of  challenges. The country was something of  a 
multi-ethnic “mini-Europe” in itself  and had, until 
the fall of  the Iron Curtain, been held together 
by a now-alien ideology and authoritarian system. 
But let us assume that the European Commission 
successfully offered economic and financial aid to 
dampen the nationalist tendencies in the various 
Yugoslav republics and to maintain the country’s 
unity. Granted, the centrifugal forces that did tear 
Yugoslavia apart were by no means merely eco-
nomic. However, in our scenario, the EU’s offer 
was substantial enough to provide incentives for 
citizens to stick with a Yugoslav Federation capable 
of  accommodating their concerns and to jointly 
become part of  the bigger Union next door.
Such a scenario allows for speculation about three 
EU policies that are all currently facing a combina-
tion of  gridlock and rudderless flux: enlargement, 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and 
the process of  attaining EU membership. While 
this exercise is probably too hypothetical to draw 
practical lessons for today’s policy from it, imagin-
ing an alternate path challenges our picture of  what 
is normal and accepted today. After all, these are 
policy areas in which distinctions between insiders 
and outsiders are key and in which the EU is seek-
ing to promote its norms. Imagining the western 
Balkans after 1989 not as a messy counterpoint to 
the EU but rather as a full member of  the Union 
challenges our real-world perceptions.
Alternative Enlargement: Yugoslav Scenario
In our scenario, Yugoslavia applied for membership 
in 1991 and started entry negotiations two years 
later alongside Austria, Finland, and Sweden. The 
relative economic health of  its three co-applicants, 
all of  whom had been developing in close rela-
tion with the European Community through their 
membership in the European Free Trade Associa-
tion (EFTA), served to highlight Yugoslavia’s own 
fundamental challenges: high unemployment, high 
public debt and inflation, and moribund socially-
owned companies that were no longer competitive. 
A privatization effort initiated in 1989 as quid pro 
quo for much-needed IMF loans was pushing the 
country toward disintegration. In turn, the empha-
sis on Yugoslav convergence highlighted problems 
with corruption and the rule of  law, which also 
cropped up throughout the EU’s eastern expansion. 
In short, Yugoslavia did not make it in on its first 
try.
As a result of  this false start, the EU ditched its 
leitmotif  of  a “reunification of  Europe” early on, 
and the process became less geopolitical and more 
merit-based as a result. The fifth enlargement was 
thus split into different phases. Yugoslavia became 
a member at the turn of  the twenty-first century, 
together with the more advanced states of  Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) – Hungary and Esto-
nia – and Malta in the Mediterranean. The early 
onset of  its economic transition made it possible 
for Yugoslavia to adopt the euro as a second-round 
member alongside Greece shortly thereafter. The 
Considering a new normal: What if Yugoslavia had joined the EU?
Cornelius Adebahr
Cornelius Adebahr speculates on the impact hypothetical Yugoslavian unity would have had on the 
European Union, and in doing so sheds light on both the strengths and weaknesses of today’s EU .
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simple fact of  having a transition country like 
Yugoslavia apply for membership in the eurozone 
led the original members to insist on stricter con-
trols for all aspirants. A second, larger group of  
countries entered the EU in the mid-2000s, includ-
ing a unified Cyprus. (Greece’s leverage was smaller 
due to the new emphasis in the enlargement pro-
cess on technical convergence, while Yugoslavia’s 
fragility in terms of  internal borders had prompted 
the EU to make acceptance of  the Annan Plan 
for Cyprus a precondition for accession. Thus the 
Cyprus dispute was resolved.) A third group cen-
tered around Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU 
after 2010.
A Different Foreign Policy
By successfully defusing the specter of  war in 
Yugoslavia by means of  enlargement policy, the EU 
avoided the piecemeal and reactive development 
of  its own foreign policy capabilities. It had time 
to devise a new foreign policy system based on 
its 1992 Maastricht Treaty (which would probably 
never have seen the light of  day without outside 
pressure to put it into practice). Overall distaste for 
violence, combined with a focus on peaceful transi-
tion in Eastern Europe, meant that the EU did not 
intervene in bloody conflicts in the heart of  Africa 
– Somalia, Rwanda, or Congo – avoiding military 
integration. Instead, NATO developed as the alli-
ance of  choice for many EU member states, enlarg-
ing eastward itself  and at the same time engaging in 
peacekeeping and peacemaking missions, most of  
them beyond Europe’s borders.
As member of  the EU, Yugoslavia, alongside for-
merly neutral member states such as Austria, Fin-
land, and Sweden, not only pushed for a clearly 
civilian approach to EU crisis management. It 
also allowed the EU to establish relations with 
important emerging powers such as India, South 
Africa, Indonesia, and Malaysia as a founding 
member of  the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). 
While Belgrade did have to drop its NAM mem-
bership upon entering the European club (along-
side Cyprus and Malta), it built on its preferential 
contacts – both personal and institutionalized – to 
capitals of  the southern hemisphere. This became 
an important asset for the EU, given that its “spe-
cial relations” with many world regions otherwise 
suffer from the colonial histories of  individual 
member states.
Shifting Membership
With nearly 24 million inhabitants, Yugoslavia 
became the EU’s fifth largest member state, drop-
ping to sixth place only when Poland (population 
38 million) joined. Until the reforms of  2001, it 
carried six votes in the Council of  Ministers, more 
than the Netherlands, Portugal, and Belgium 
respectively. And until more recently, it wielded 17 
votes, equivalent to Sweden and Finland combined, 
or the votes of  Austria plus those of  Denmark. 
Relatively powerful on paper, Yugoslavia, how-
ever, remained fragile. The country has sometimes 
described as a big Belgium – organized in a highly 
federal, dysfunctional way. Each of  Yugoslavia’s 
six “republics” used the EU to strengthen its hand 
vis-à-vis the federal government, not least via the 
Committee of  the Regions in Brussels. In particular, 
the republics of  Slovenia and Croatia teamed up 
with such regions as Bavaria, Catalonia, and Scot-
land to fight for their share of  European influence 
and money. The Serbian Republic, in contrast, was 
held back by a complicated power-sharing deal with 
its autonomous Kosovar minority.
As a result, there has been a new power distribution 
within the EU, with a shift of  competences away 
from the member governments in favor of  both 
the European and regional levels. Economic and 
social policies, including issues such as employment, 
migration, and social security systems, are largely 
set in Brussels, whereas policies for infrastructure 
and transport, education, and culture have gone 
to the regions. This leaves the member states with 
fewer competencies. Yet, the force of  Yugoslav 
decentralization has become so strong – despite, 
or even because of, the economic and financial 
benefits of  belonging to the EU – that the EU 
very recently had to facilitate the breakaway of  one 
republic. This “velvet divorce” sets a precedent for 
independence movements in old member states, 
with the EU now facing a regrouping of  its mem-
bership toward a greater number of  small- to mid-
sized states.
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Tempting as it is to speculate about what would 
have happened had Yugoslavia avoided both war 
and break-up, it is hard for those who know the 
region well to imagine that the transition from the 
Yugoslav slogan of  “brotherhood and unity” to the 
EU’s motto “unity in diversity” would have been 
without friction. Still, speculation about an alter-
native state of  “normality” has some merit – for 
looking through the hypothetical lens allows us to 
see the weaknesses of  the current EU more clearly.
Three lessons stand out, and the EU today has 
in fact started to address two of  them. First, the 
EU should have adapted its rules for enlargement 
earlier in the process, and would have done so if  
it had gained better knowledge of  the difficulties 
of  a continued transition in its new member states. 
Yugoslavia’s hypothetical economic and social pains 
of  adapting to join the euro throughout the 1990s 
would have provided the EU with a valuable lesson 
about how to address the current crises in Greece 
and Spain today. In reality, the EU has only recently 
started to address the question of  conditionality, 
especially with regard to its Neighborhood Policy 
(and will likely see its magnetism fade vis-à-vis 
Ukraine).
Second, the Union would have a much less devel-
oped security and defense policy, and its global 
foreign policy would have even fewer military teeth 
than it has today. In its global foreign policy the 
EU did make some progress by carefully involving 
various partners and regional groupings around the 
world. However, this is an area where it could still 
become much stronger.
The third and final lesson of  Yugoslavia’s hypo-
thetical entry to the EU, however, remains an open 
one. It is, in fact, a question: whether the Nation 
State is still the determining framework for meeting 
Europe’s twenty-first century challenges. The inclu-
sion of  Yugoslavia, a multiethnic member state 
with a weak federal structure, would have hastened 
a number of  today’s debates and complaints: the 
discussion of  eroding national sovereignty in the 
aftermath of  the financial crisis; recurring com-
plaints about a “democratic disconnect” through-
out Europe; independence movements, such as 
those to be found in Catalonia and Scotland. The 
EU needs urgently to tackle the fundamental ques-
tion of  the Nation State. Far from providing use-
ful answers in itself, at least a member state called 
Yugoslavia would have forced the EU to address it 
much earlier.
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The euro currency union, memorably described 
by one European government as a burning house 
without doors or windows, is being blamed for 
problems in fact triggered by the global financial 
crisis. Would Europe really have been better off  
without the euro, as many commentators claim? 
The answer, perhaps surprisingly, is an almost 
unequivocal “no.” Although the euro is commonly 
viewed as the result of  unfortunate political ideol-
ogy and horse trading between France and Ger-
many, this interpretation ignores its hard economic 
rationale. Currency union provides the exchange-
rate stability that Europe’s open, trade-oriented 
economies need. A Europe without this stability 
would have lurched far deeper into crisis than it has 
today.
The Economic Rationale for Currency Union
Contrary to general wisdom, Europe’s winding 
journey toward currency union has been driven 
less by political factors than economic imperatives. 
Exchange-rate risks have always been a barrier to 
international trade. For Europe’s competitive, open 
economies, the task of  decreasing or eliminating 
currency fluctuations has therefore been particu-
larly pressing. During the Great Depression of  the 
1930s, for instance, European “beggar thy neigh-
bor” policies (increasing competitiveness through 
devaluations) led to competitive devaluations and 
the complete collapse of  the international financial 
system, heralding a long and deep recession.
Happily, Europe can look back on a long tradition 
of  learning from its mistakes. A prohibition against 
such beggar practices was articulated repeatedly 
by the founding fathers of  the European project. 
After the collapse of  the Bretton Woods system 
in 1971, European states began a long quest for 
monetary stability, which led to the establishment 
of  the European Monetary System (EMS), with 
an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) as its key 
component. They recognized that the stabilization 
of  the exchange rate was crucial for market integra-
tion; common and single markets would never have 
functioned on the basis of  full-floating exchange-
rate regimes.
The creation of  a common market for agricultural 
products (a cornerstone of  all subsequent political 
and economic integration) required action against 
currency risk, as volatility would have invited 
market distortions. And with plans for an internal 
market based on four freedoms (goods, workers, 
capital, and services), the rationale for creating a 
currency union only became stronger, despite the 
political and economic tumult of  1992–93, when 
ERM underwent an existential crisis. Thus if  the 
road map for the euro had not been created, the 
ambitious plans for a single market would have 
demanded the establishment of  another stabiliza-
tion mechanism.
Would the Alternative Have Been Any 
Better?
By 1989, therefore, a basic truth had become clear: 
the economic rationale for exchange-rate stability was 
so strong in Europe that if  governments had failed to 
agree to introduce a common currency, the pressure 
for a different system of  exchange-rate stabilization 
would have remained. Yet, it is a matter of  political 
choice how and whether to bend to this economic 
rationale, and it was indeed political factors just as 
much as economic that led to the actual compromise 
on the euro. The real-world outcome reflected the 
strength of  the newly reunited Germany, with Bonn 
agreeing to French pressure to give up the deutsche 
mark and Europeanize itself  in return for a German-
looking currency union. But let us imagine that that 
did not happen. The failure of  this Franco-German 
compromise would have led to a very different 
response to the problems of  exchange-rate volatility.
Better Off Without: What If the EU Had Never Created the Euro?
By Paweł Tokarski
Paweł Tokarski asks how the EU would have fared without the euro, finding that monetary union has 
had a comparatively moderating effect on its economics and politics and that it could hardly have been 
avoided .
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Had the heads of  state and government not agreed 
with the conclusions of  the 1989 Delors report or 
had they cancelled the currency union plans due 
to the economic slowdown of  1993–94, we can 
assume that they would have created a Genuine 
European Monetary System (GEMS) designed 
for the “sustainable growth and well-being of  EU 
citizens” (written into the conclusions under pres-
sure from the French delegation and several states 
from the southern flank). A European Stability and 
Welfare Institute would have been tasked with man-
aging the loans maintaining exchange-rate stability. 
The basic bands would have reflected ample ERM 
margins (+/-15 percent) but with a possibility for 
more disciplined member states to considerably 
lower the bands, an option that a group of  north-
erners (Germany, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Ben-
elux, and Sweden) would have taken.
In the real world, the existence of  the common 
currency put an end to speculative attacks. In our 
alternative history, these would have persisted 
under a system like GEMS; its simple mechanism 
of  exchange-rate stabilization would not have 
given this comfort. The financial markets would 
have been inherently skeptical of  the sustainability 
of  GEMS, since its creation would have opened 
the bloc to speculative attacks, leading to continu-
ous exchange-rate volatility, pushing states into 
costly interventions, and most likely forcing vari-
ous economies to leave the system temporarily or 
permanently. The probability is that GEMS would 
not have seen the new millennium, let alone global 
financial meltdown.
But not all GEMS states would have profited from 
the lower borrowing costs associated with a deeper 
system of  integration like a currency union. As a 
result, GEMS would have boasted certain com-
parative strengths over the euro. The yields of  
government bonds would not have narrowed to 
the degree apparent today, and the governments 
in Italy and Greece would feel constant pressure 
to limit their current account deficits and imple-
ment responsible fiscal policies. That said, it is 
also probable that the sovereign-debt crisis would 
have started ten years earlier if  EU states had not 
enjoyed the credibility conferred by a currency 
union and its governance rules. Already in the 
mid-1990s, Italy had exceeded 120 percent debt to 
GDP (and not merely because the perspective of  
joining the euro had slashed its borrowing costs). 
Moreover, housing bubbles and weaknesses in the 
banking sectors would have emerged even without 
the euro.
The Alternative Financial and Economic 
Crisis
Still, let us imagine that we were lucky enough to 
keep GEMS alive until the outbreak of  the global 
financial crisis in 2007, or even until the last quarter 
of  2009, when Greece’s real problems began. The 
onset of  the global financial crisis and the news 
of  “creative” accounting in Athens (not checked by 
Brussels – even superficially) would have put pres-
sure on the drachma and increased Greece’s sover-
eign-debt costs. The central bank of  Greece would 
not have been able to maintain the exchange rate. 
Moreover, the temptation to boost competitiveness 
through devaluation would have been difficult to 
resist, not just in Greece but also in Spain, Portu-
gal, and Italy. The immediate effect of  this toxic 
therapy would have been a considerable increase in 
inflation, investors fleeing the markets, a liquidity 
crunch in the financial sector, a steep decrease of  
trade within the EU, and a long and deep economic 
recession in Europe.
With the crisis escalating, the south would have had 
to take further measures. After all, when the real 
global financial crisis reached the real economy in 
2008, voices in France advocated channeling sup-
port to domestic business from the budget. Fortu-
nately for all, these plans were quickly and broadly 
slapped down by EU leaders able to block them 
thanks to the governance mechanisms of  the inter-
nal market. In the absence of  the common cur-
rency, this avalanche of  protective actions would 
have been hard to contain.
All this would have led to a vicious north-south 
standoff  within the EU, with even stronger nega-
tive implications for intra-EU trade. The German-
led north would have robustly counteracted the 
south’s competitive devaluations and protective 
measures in order to defend its own competi-
tiveness and trade prospects. Due to historical 
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constraints imposed by the country’s painful 
experience of  hyperinflation in the 1920s and the 
high level of  household savings, it would have 
been politically and legally difficult to weaken the 
deutsche mark. So the only way to go would have 
been the introduction of  compensatory protection-
ist measures detrimental to the very existence of  
the internal market in several key areas, with all the 
obvious implications for EU sustainability in its 
current form. The single market would have been 
geographically reduced, causing some headache for 
lawyers (in the rosiest scenario).
The north-south conflict would also have been 
transmitted to the EU institutions, resulting in deci-
sion-making paralysis – the fragmentation or disin-
tegration of  the single market having already led to 
a significant decrease in the role of  the European 
Commission, increasing the role of  deals between 
clusters of  member states. In circumstances of  
constant intergovernmental tension, it would be 
hard to imagine the negotiations over the Multi-
annual Financial Framework 2014–20 (the EU’s 
budgetary framework) reaching a successful con-
clusion. Nobody would have been willing to make 
any commitments concerning future payments into 
the EU’s purse not knowing what would happen 
tomorrow.
The End of Europe as We Nearly Knew It
There would have been no winners in this alterna-
tive scenario. If  the EU did survive the fragmenta-
tion of  the internal market, it would have probably 
split into a kind of  customs union governed princi-
pally by the leaders and ministers, with a hard core 
internal market of  more deeply integrated strong 
economies like Germany, France, Austria, Den-
mark, the Benelux, Sweden, plus the Baltics, Poland, 
and Slovakia. The UK, given the choice between 
deep integration with a core market or looser coop-
eration on its peripheries, would have been politi-
cally paralyzed. But as if  that were not enough, 
now add to this picture a new east-west tension: 
the lack of  agreement for cohesion funding within 
any new budgetary framework would have seriously 
damaged support for the EU in the new member 
states, slowing down their catch-up process.
The general dip in economic performance would 
have applied to Germany, too, heralding a pro-
longed period in power for the SPD and Chancel-
lor Gerhard Schröder. German democracy would 
have survived unscathed, but several southern 
members would have experienced major economic 
and political problems. With the devaluation tool 
still available, moreover, there would have been no 
incentive for structural reforms. Economic stagna-
tion would have clouded out prospects for a better 
future. High-level inflation and economic crisis 
would have wiped out middle class savings, leading 
to a decrease of  the role of  southern EU members, 
making the countries prone to populism – a good 
environment for extremist forces to grow, not 
entirely unlike 1930s Europe.
In short, far from being a costly ideological error, 
the common currency has actually helped Europe 
avoid the risk of  repeating the economic mistakes 
of  the past. The single currency has spawned a 
robust regional economic policy regime that has 
prevented EU states from resorting to populist 
and selfish options. The alternative scenario would 
have created new barriers in Europe and consid-
erably decreased the continent’s significance in 
international economic relations, making it a good 
playground for other assertive economic play-
ers such as China and Russia. Despite the huge 
costs of  financial assistance and austerity as well 
as persistent problems and uncertainties, the euro 
has helped the EU keep its construction rela-
tively intact and even reinforced it internally and 
externally.
The most important task now is therefore for 
governments to acknowledge that the origins of  
Europe’s structural problems do not lie in some 
supranational project – a common currency, for 
example – but in the capital cities of  Europe. Such 
problems will not be solved without recognizing 
the serious flaws that persist at the national level.
DGAPanalyse 19 | October 2014
42
DGAPanalyse 19 | October 2014
43
Cornelius Adebahr is an associate in the Europe pro-
gram at the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace in Washington, DC and an associate fellow 
at the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European 
Policy Studies at the German Council on Foreign 
Relations (DGAP) in Berlin.
Josef  Janning is senior policy fellow at the European 
Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in Berlin. At 
the time of  writing he was Mercator Fellow at the 
Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy 
Studies at the DGAP.
Dariusz Kalan is a senior research fellow and Central 
Europe analyst at the Polish Institute of  Interna-
tional Affairs (PISM) in Warsaw.
Stefan Meister is head of  program for Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia at the Robert Bosch Cen-
ter for Central Europe, Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia at the DGAP.
Almut Möller heads the Alfred von Oppenheim 
Center for European Policy Studies at the DGAP 
in Berlin and is a non-resident fellow at the Ameri-
can Institute for Contemporary German Studies 
(AICGS) at Johns Hopkins University in Washing-
ton DC.
Tim Oliver is a Senior Lecturer at the Department 
of  Defence and International Affairs at the Royal 
Military Academy Sandhurst. At the time of  writ-
ing he was a fellow at the Center for Transatlantic 
Studies at the Nitze School of  Advanced Interna-
tional Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University.
Roderick Parkes heads the EU program at the Polish 
Institute of  International Affairs (PISM) in Warsaw 
and is a non-resident senior fellow of  the Ger-
man Institute of  International and Security Affairs 
(SWP).
Hugh Pope is International Crisis Group’s deputy 
director for Europe and Central Asia and director 
of  its Turkey/Cyprus Project.
Jan Techau is director of  Carnegie Europe in 
Brussels.
Paweł Tokarski is an associate at the German Insti-
tute of  International and Security Affairs (SWP) in 
Berlin and non-resident fellow of  Polish Institute 
of  International Affairs (PISM).
Nicolai von Ondarza is a senior associate in the EU 
Program at the German Institute for International 
and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin.
1 The essays in this compilation were published between December 2013 and February 2014 and thus reflect the state of  affairs 
prevailing around January 2014. Since they met with considerable interest in the policy community we decided to publish them 
jointly in this collection.
2 Bradley MacKay (2008) “What if ?: Synthesizing Debates and Advancing the Prospects of  Using Virtual History in Manage-
ment and Organizational Theory,” in Management & Organizational History 2, no. 4, pp. 295–314.
Notes
About the Authors
DGAPanalyse 19 | October 2014
44

Herausgeber: Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider, Otto Wolff-Direktor des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e. V. | 
Rauchstraße 17/18 | 10787 Berlin | Tel.: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-0 | Fax: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-16 | info@dgap.org | www.dgap.org |  
ISSN 1611-7034 | © 2014 DGAP
